



Pwning Adobe Reader

Abusing the Reader's embedded XFA engine for reliable Exploitation

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Agenda

- whoami
- Motivation
- (Short!) Introduction to XFA
- XFA Internals
 - XFA Objects
 - jfCacheManager
- Exploiting the Reader
- Conclusion
- Q&A





whoami

- Sebastian Apelt (@bitshifter123)
- Co-Founder of siberas in 2009
 - IT-Security Consulting (Pentests, Code Audits, etc.)
 - Research
- Low-level addict
 - Reverse Engineering, Bughunting, Exploitation
 - > 100 CVEs in all kinds of Products
 - Pwn2Own 2014 (IE11 on Win8.1 x64)









Fuzzing at siberas

- Let's pwn the Reader @ Pwn2Own 2016!!
 - Unfortunately, no love for Reader this time $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{S}}$
- In 2015: XFA fuzzing on 128 cores
- Fuzz run yielded thousands of crashes
- So far ~ 20 Bugs identified as unique (upcoming)
- Analysis took ages...
- Let's take a look at a typical Reader crash!





(72fc.72ec): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!) eax=69572c30 ebx=00000002 ecx=07b2f3cc edx=05658af8 esi=0549e538 edi=07b2f3cc eip=20a29654 esp=0031d8c4 ebp=00000003 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00210206

AcroForm!DllUnregisterServer+0x2f73ce:

20a29654 mov edx,dword ptr [eax] ds:002b:69572c30=???????

0:000> !heap -p -a ecx address 07b2f3cc found in _HEAP @ 11a0000 HEAP_ENTRY Size Prev Flags UserPtr UserSize - state 07b24eb0 199c 0000 [00] 07b24eb8 0ccd8 - (busy)

0:000> kc

AcroForm!DllUnregisterServer+0x2f73ce AcroForm!DllUnregisterServer+0x2f7212 AcroForm!DllUnregisterServer+0x2f7504 AcroForm!DllUnregisterServer+0x35f3ae AcroForm!DllUnregisterServer+0x358f50 Awesome, we have a crash!

But no useful function name (DIIUnregisterServer??)

The object holding the bad reference is located in the middle of a huge buffer => Page Heap useless

Stacktrace also not helpful





- Adobe Reader => No symbols / RTTI infos!
 - No function names
 - No object / vtable information
 - No meaningful stacktraces
 - Page Heap useless
- Root cause analysis is very hard without context
- Complicates crash triaging during fuzz runs





- How do we ANALYZE crashes in XFA?How do we EXPLOIT these crashes?
- Obvious: We need context! We need symbols!
- No *in-depth* research about XFA internals so far:
 - Most useful: Writeups about XFA exploit from 2013 (David and Enrique of Immunity Inc, Matthieu Bonetti of Portcullis Labs)
 - Good technical analysis, but only scratching the surface





Write tools to recover contextual information

- Lower the bar for other researchers!
- Check https://github.com/siberas in the next days
- Facilitate:
 - Vulnerability discovery and root cause analysis
 - Crash triaging during fuzz runs
- Deliver XFA-specific background for exploitation







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XFA: "XML Forms Architecture"

- Specification developed by JetForm, later Accelio (acquired by Adobe in 2002) – not a standard
- Latest version: 3.3 (01/2012): Easy read of 1584 pages.
- Brings dynamic behavior to the static PDF world: Forms that can dynamically change their layout!
- Dynamic nature of XFA is powered by Javascript (Spidermonkey 24 since AR DC)
- XFA not supported by many PDF Readers, yet (Chrome/Chromium, Firefox, Windows,...)





- XFA form data itself is an XML-structure embedded in the PDF, a so-called XDP-Packet
- Javascript embedded in this XDP
 - Executed upon events (e.g. document is fully loaded, user clicks on button, etc.)
- A practical example...





<xdp:xdp > mlns:xdp="http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/"> <config > mlns:xfa="http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/3.0/">

[...]

</config>

<template <mark>xmlns:xfa="http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/3.0/</mark>">

<subform layout="tb" name="form1">

<pageSet>

<pageArea id="PageArea1" name="PageArea1">

<contentArea w="612pt" h="792pt" x="20pt" y="20pt"/>

</pageArea>

</pageSet>

```
<field name="button1" w="41.275mm" h="9.525mm">
```

<ui>

```
<button highlight="inverted"/>
```

</ui>

```
[...]
```

```
<event activity="click" name="event__click">
<script contentType="application/x-javascript">
app.alert(1337);
</script>
```

</event>

</xdp:xdp>

XDP Packet is XML embedded in the PDF The root tag is always "xdp"

Config DOM contains configuration options for XFA processing

Template DOM is structured in subforms, containing objects like "field", "text", etc.

Objects can contain event objects that fire on certain actions (e.g. "click")




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XFA spec defines multiple DOMs

HUGE attack surface (> 200 objects accessible via JS)





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XFA Internals



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XFA Internals - General Approach

Tweet by @nils



@_frego_ You can get the symbols from the Solaris build of Reader ;) The allocator is called jfCacheManager (functions:getMemoryCache, etc.)

- Nice! Some Solaris build seems to have symbols!
- Newest version which still has symbols: Solaris v9.4.1
- We need a *reliable* heuristic to port symbols in AcroForm.api (module which implements XFA functionality) to newer AR versions





XFA Internals - General Approach

Problems:

- Code is rather old (2012) -> Many Code changes from v9.X to AR DC...
 - Function count: Solaris ~48 K, AR DC ~ 95 K
- Functions differ even if code stays the same (compiler optimizations like heavy inlining in v9.4.1 screw it up)
 - Tried diffing with Diaphora Too many false positives
- Structures, objects and vtable sizes differ (slightly, but enough to make it very hard to create reliable heuristics)

• etc.





XFA Internals - General Approach

- Approach: Trying to understand Reader v9.4.1 as much as possible with the help of symbols
- Find bulletproof ways to recover the most important symbols, i.e.
 - Heap Mgmt functions for the custom allocator
 - Object information





What do we need to know about objects?


- How to identify an object in memory
- Vtable offsets
- Methods and properties exposed to JavaScript
- Offsets of the entrypoints for methods / propertygetters and -setters
- Function names of vtable entries





XFA Internals - Objects: Identification

First attempt: XFANode::getClassTag



Fail! classTags not constant across versions!




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XFA Internals - Objects: Identification

<XFAObj>::Type method to the rescue

Located @ vtable+8 of each XFA-Object



Type-IDs are static across versions!




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XFA Internals - Objects: Identification

- Possible to identify every object by a binary pattern in newer versions of AcroForm.api
 - mov eax, 7C46h
 retn
 B8 46 7C 00 00 C3
- Xref to the Type method gives us the vtable offset (RVA) to each object!

We can safely identify 334 objects! Not too bad!





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What do we need to know about objects?

- 🔹 How to identify an object in memory 🗸
- Vtable offsets
- Methods and properties exposed to JavaScript
- Offsets of the entrypoints for methods / propertygetters and -setters
- Function names of vtable entries





How about methods and properties?


<XFAObj>::getScriptTable() @ vtable offset 0x34



- References *moScriptTable* structure
 - Structure contains information about method and property names, function pointers, etc.









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What do we need to know about objects?

- How to identify an object in memory
- Vtable offsets
- Methods and properties exposed to JavaScript
- Offsets of the entrypoints for methods / propertygetters and -setters
- Function names of vtable entries

TODO... Not trivial... ;-(





- Most allocations in AcroForm.api are managed by a custom allocator called *jfCacheManager*
- LIFO-style heap manager
- Data buffers ("blocks") stored in big heap "chunks"
- Introduced most likely for performance reasons
- No security features...
 - No Heap Isolation (see IE, Flash, etc.)
 - No Anti-UAF like MemProtect/MemGC






Disclaimer: Next slides will only cover the *relevant* details of the memory manager in terms of *exploitation*!

(More in-depth analysis will be covered by a paper which will be released soon)






Very simplified version of the jfCacheManager:





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sizeof(chunk) derived from block size:

base_size = 0xc350 // 50.000 chunksize = ((((size + 3) / 4) + 1) * ((base_size + size - 1) / size)) * 4

Example: allocation size = 0x64 => chunksize = 26 * (0xc3b3 / 0x64) * 4 = 0xcb20

"So, if I get a crash and I see my object located in a chunk of size 0xcb20, then sizeof(obj) == 0x64?"

Unfortunately not...






- jfMemoryCacheLists can manage blocks of *multiple* sizes
 => blocks of sizes X and Y can both end up in chunk Z!
- alloc(X) will be placed in same chunk as alloc(Y) if
 - an allocation for a size Y > X has occured before and
 - size X is in the same "range" as size Y
 - Ranges reach from 2ⁿ to (2ⁿ⁺¹-1) (e.g. 0x20 0x3f, 0x40 0x7f)
 - In short:
 - Does the new block fit into some chunk that we already have?
 - If yes, use that chunk instead of allocating a new one!









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


Let's take a look at the structures within the chunks and what happens during alloc / free operations...





Initial state – All blocks are free




- next_alloc_ptr points to the block which will be returned with the next allocation
- flinks form a single linked list separating the data blocks





After first allocation




- next_alloc_ptr is overwritten with flink
- *flink* is overwritten with pointer back to jfMemoryCache
- allocs_counter is incremented to 1





After second allocation




- next_alloc_ptr is overwritten with flink
- *flink* is overwritten with pointer back to jfMemoryCache
- allocs_counter is incremented to 2





After third allocation




- next_alloc_ptr is overwritten with flink
- *flink* is overwritten with pointer back to jfMemoryCache
- allocs_counter is incremented to 3





Free second block



next_alloc_ptr is overwritten with pointer to free block - 4

- *jfMC** is overwritten with *next_alloc_ptr* (becomes flink again)
- allocs_counter is decremented to 2





- Still don't like the jfCacheManager?
- Still missing Page Heap?
- Get offset "jfCacheManager_active" with XFAnalyze_funcs.py
- Change byte from 1 to 0 in binary
- Replace original AcroForm.api
- You just switched off the jfCacheManager :P





Exploiting the Reader



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Exploiting the Reader



Goals

 Bypass ASLR by corrupting specific byte(s) to cause a memory leak

• Find "flexible" overwrite target

- No need for a write-what-where (e.g. 0-DWORD write or a partial overwrite to a controlled address should suffice!)
- Find technique which is fast, reliable and most importantly independent from OS and AR version





Exploiting the Reader

Let's target the metadata contained within the chunks!
 Two possibilities:
 Hit a flink
 Block is free

Chunk						\Rightarrow Triggers
0x00	jfMC*	61616161	61610161	61616161		allocate
0x10	61616161	flink				Hit the jfN
0x20			jfMC* 🗲	63636363		\Rightarrow Block is
0x30	63636363	63636363	63636363	flink		\Rightarrow Triggers
0x40						freed
0x50	flink					
		flink				


Hit the jfMemoryCache* ⇒ Block is allocated ⇒ Triggers when block is

when block is

Both methods can be abused create a memory leak! But hitting the *flink* is the easiest way to go










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
After flink overwrite



- Requirement: flink must point to controlled data after overwrite
- Still very flexible: Doable with nearly any kind of mem corruption!
- Let's see what happens when we allocate the "bad" block








- next_alloc_ptr is overwritten with the "bad" flink
- flink is overwritten with pointer back to jfMemoryCache
- Now what happens when we allocate an object of size 0x10...?







- Next allocation will return the data buffer after the "flink"
- The object will be placed in the middle of our controlled data
 => We get a vtable in controlled data!!





- As soon as the vtable is in a controlled area you can just read it out
- The controlled data area can be sprayed with strings or even float arrays as "landing zone"
- Set the overwritten float or replace the string with data which will point to your ROP pivot gadget
- For floats: You can compute their binary representation after spec IEEE754:
 - 4.18356164518379836860971488084E-216 will be 0x13371337deadc0de on the heap
- GAME OVER!







Let's have a look at a practical example...

Setting:

A *O-DWORD write primitive* to an arbitrary address




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- Plan: Attack a flink in a chunk with block size 0x180 => corresponding target chunk size will be 0xc68c
- **0**x180??
 - 0x180 == sizeof(jfDocumentImpl Object)
 - First object of this size which is created on jfCache
 - Range mechanism => Every object of size 0x100 0x180 will be placed in same chunk
 - Biggest object we can create: The template object
 - sizeof(Template object) == 0x140
 - Due to the rather unusual size it is "quiet" in this chunk
 - Perfect for exploit reliability








- Spray ~ 5000 * 0xc68c-sized buffers (~ 250MB)
- Address 0x10101000 will be mapped
 - This will be our target address for the "first shot"








- After writing to 0x10101000 search through strings or array entries for the overwritten data
- From the overwrite offset you can compute the base address of buffer X!










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- Before freeing the 0xc68c-sized buffer: Defragment size 0x180 on jfCache to fill "holes" in the heap
- After freeing the 0xc68c-sized buffer: Allocate exactly 132 template objects:
 - 132 * (0x180 + 4) = 0xc810
 - => At least one chunk of size 0xc68c *must* be allocated
 - => This chunk will replace the freed buffer
- The newly allocated chunk is NOT filled completely with allocated items – the last block in the chunk will be *free* with near 100% reliability








- We know the address of flink: chunkaddr + 131* (0x180+4)
- Partial overwrite: 0x10XXYYZZ => 0x10000000 (controlled!)
- Now allocate template objects of size 0x140.....!



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




- The template-object will be placed into our data
- Search for changed bytes in our strings / arrays again
- Find vtable => ASLR bypassed => PWND! (EIP/ROP trivial...)









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Conclusion

- Very easy, but highly effective technique to leak data
- No global RW primitive, but enough to pwn AR
- Version-independant
- OS-independant
- Very fast: From start to pwn ~ 1 sec if you use strings
 - Arrays are more elegant but searching them is sloooow...
- Flexible technique which can be used with almost every kind of overwrite
- Custom allocator proves once again to be a perfect target in memory corruption scenarios





Thank you for your attention! ③





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